A subdomain takeover vulnerability was detected on staging.example.com. The subdomain has a CNAME record pointing to an Azure resource (e.g. *.cloudapp.net) that was deleted or never created. The target no longer exists, so resolution returns NXDOMAIN (or an error), but the CNAME still points to that Azure hostname. An attacker can create the same resource in their own Azure subscription and serve content on your subdomain.
The subdomain currently has a CNAME pointing to:
abandoned-app.cloudapp.net (or similar *.cloudapp.net / *.azurewebsites.net)This is different from DNS zone takeover (where NS records point to an abandoned zone). Here the subdomain points to a deleted Azure app/resource; there are no NS records involved.
If an attacker claims the orphaned Azure resource:
This is a medium-severity vulnerability; same impact as high-severity takeovers but may require the attacker to claim the resource in the same cloud region or under the same naming rules.
Check that the subdomain points to Azure and fails to resolve:
dig staging.example.com CNAME +short
dig staging.example.com A +short
abandoned-app.cloudapp.net (or *.cloudapp.net / *.azurewebsites.net).Optional: Try visiting https://staging.example.com. If you see an Azure “site not found” or connection error while the CNAME points to *.cloudapp.net, the resource is unclaimed and an attacker could create it.
staging.example.com CNAME record or point it to a valid destination.If you encountered an issue or false positive, contact [email protected].